As for the UNRWA issue, please refer to my previous postings （http://d.hatena.ne.jp/itunalily2/20120928）（http://d.hatena.ne.jp/itunalily2/20121004）（http://d.hatena.ne.jp/itunalily2/20121024）（http://d.hatena.ne.jp/itunalily2/20121102）（http://d.hatena.ne.jp/itunalily2/20121108）（http://d.hatena.ne.jp/itunalily2/20121114）.
As for the news in the Star Online （No.5）, I found it very strange that Malaysia, who has no diplomatic ties with Israel, demanded Israel to cease its use of military forces towards specific terrorists in Gaza. It was Hamas who started aggression towards the State of Israel. The first victims are Jewish Israelis in the State of Israel. Why victims must continue to be victims? (Lily)
１．Middle East Forum（http://www.meforum.org/3380/israel-relations-unrwa）
Jerusalem's Surprisingly Good Relations with UNRWA
by Baruch Spiegel
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2012 VOLUME XIX: NUMBER 4
The relationship between the State of Israel and the U.N. Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)—an agency catering to an Arab population that could at best be described as unfriendly—is little known and little understood. Yet for UNRWA to operate effectively in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where the bulk of its constituency resides, it must interact and collaborate with the Jewish state, which has exerted overwhelming influence on these territories since the Six-Day War of June 1967. The result has been an uneasy marriage of convenience between two unlikely bedfellows that has helped perpetuate the problem both have allegedly sought to resolve.
Early Interactions
Arab refugees return to the West Bank, August 1967. One of the consequences of the 1967 Six-Day War was Israel's sudden jurisdiction over Palestinians living in UNRWA-run refugee camps. Rather than take over the management of this population, Israel formally recognized UNRWA's activity in the West Bank and Gaza.
Having taken over responsibility from UNRWA in July 1952 for the 17,000 Arab refugees who remained in its territory after the 1948 war (out of a 150,000-strong Arab population),[1]Jerusalem had no intention of doing the same in the wake of the 1967 Six-Day War, which brought under its control a sizable Arab population that had some, if not all, of its needs met by UNRWA. Instead, the government decided to institutionalize its relationship with the U.N. agency, and on June 14, 1967, Israel's U.N. ambassador, Michael Comay, and UNRWA's commissioner-general, Lawrence Michelmore, signed a formal agreement establishing recognition by the State of Israel of UNRWA's activity in the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli government committed itself to "nonintervention" in the U.N. agency's affairs in the humanitarian sphere but reserved the right to intervene in cases of national security. Specifically, the Israeli government agreed:
(a) To ensure the protection and security of the personnel, installations, and property of UNRWA;
(b) To permit the free movement of UNRWA vehicles into, within, and out of Israel and the areas in question;
(c) To permit the international staff of the agency to move in, out, and within Israel and the areas in question; they will be provided with identity documents and any other passes which might be required;
(d) To permit the local staff of the agency to move within the areas in question under arrangements made or to be made with the military authorities;
(e) To provide radio, telecommunications, and landing facilities;
(f) Pending a further supplementary agreement, to maintain the previously existing financial arrangements with the governmental authorities then responsible for the areas in question.[2]
From 1967 until the first intifada in December 1987, there were no extraordinary tensions or major disputes between UNRWA and the Israeli military administration. However, relations took a turn for the worse in Israeli-UNRWA relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s as violence erupted in the UNRWA-administered refugee camps during the first intifada. The Israeli authorities concluded that some of UNRWA's employees were members or supporters of terrorist organizations and that its facilities were being used to support and carry out terrorist activity.[3] UNRWA's operations had become exceedingly politicized with the agency promoting anti-Israeli propaganda—including the use of deeply troubling textbooks demonizing Israel—and advocating an uncompromising stand on Palestinian demands. UNRWA vehicles including ambulances were used to transport terrorists and weapons for terrorist organizations.[4] The Israeli authorities demanded the arrest of suspects in these activities, but UNRWA insisted that its employees enjoyed diplomatic immunity. Jerusalem also demanded the right to stop and search UNRWA vehicles, but the agency objected and filed complaints with the Security Council.[5] To protect the country, Israeli leaders deployed defensive mechanisms such as imposing curfews and increasing the number of checkpoints and travel restrictions applying to Palestinian employees of UNRWA. The agency responded by complaining that these security arrangements interrupted daily life and education in the territories.
Tensions were reduced after the signing of the 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israeli and Palestinian leaders and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the legally recognized governing body of the Palestinian Arabs. Israeli responsibility for the Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza was transferred to the PA, and the relationships between the government of Israel and UNRWA greatly improved.
The Lesser of Two Evils
As late as 1994, when control of the Palestinian population passed to Yasser Arafat's PA, Israel still provided more funding than all Arab countries except Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Morocco.[6] This excluded funding of schools and medical care, which were a part of UNRWA's budget and not the responsibility of the Israeli government. On principal, Jerusalem did not involve itself in UNRWA's internal working procedures while the framework of the mandate was agreeable. Only when there were violations and differences of opinion about UNRWA's mandate, did Israel interfere. Most of the reasons were practical.
The so-called second intifada (2000-05) once again saw violence occurring in and originating from UNRWA-administered refugee camps. Once more the Israeli government felt compelled to send in troops to quell violence and hunt down terrorists targeting its civilians. Once more UNRWA officials protested the incursions into their jurisdiction.[7]
Eventually, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) gained the upper hand in suppressing terrorist activity in the territories, and a tense but quiet period took hold. Although violent clashes with the IDF have diminished in the territories since 2005, Gaza in particular has seen an escalation and an attendant rise in Israeli-UNRWA tensions. With the Israeli government's removal of all Jewish residents and defense personnel from the strip in the summer of 2005 and the subsequent Hamas takeover of the territory in June 2007, Israeli-UNRWA relations have gone through several trying periods.
After some 6,000 rockets had been fired from Gaza at Israeli population centers in the south of the country,[8] Jerusalem launched Operation Cast Lead in December 2008- January 2009 to strike back at Hamas and its allies. In the course of the fighting, scores of homes and other facilities were extensively damaged including, in some cases, UNRWA facilities. As expected, UNRWA noisily protested what it maintained were unwarranted attacks on its neutrality while the Israeli authorities argued that the agency had enabled Hamas operatives to use its facilities both as "human" shields and areas of operation.[9]UNRWA also claimed that many Gazan students experienced posttraumatic stress following the IDF military campaign.[10] However, the Israeli government allowed 243 Gaza residents to enter Israel for medical and humanitarian reasons via the Erez Crossing,[11] and Israeli civilian hospitals were also prepared to treat the injured.
In the aftermath of the fighting, UNRWA asked to be placed in charge of the reconstruction of damaged public buildings, schools, clinics, and housing projects. Forced to choose between allowing Hamas to carry out the reconstruction or work with UNRWA, Israeli officials preferred to partner with UNRWA, hoping this would prevent the Islamist terror group from obtaining dual-use construction materials.
This, however, does not mean that whatever UNRWA desires becomes a fait accompli. The agency has submitted requests for more than 200 projects, only to have about half of them approved by the Israeli government. For example, UNRWA offered to manage the rebuilding of schools in a particular area, but Jerusalem rejected the proposal because the sites were too close to Hamas military posts[12] and only approved the projects after UNRWA chose other sites.
In 2011, the Israeli Army Spokesperson's Unit announced "widespread construction" in the Gaza Strip with the approval of 121 projects funded by international organizations, including UNRWA and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).[13] Israel is aware of the possibility that part of the construction materiel could end up in the hands of Hamas, but nonetheless views UNRWA as the lesser evil.
By mid-2012, Israeli authorities had approved a number of new projects in Gaza.[14] UNRWA has to receive a permit for every project that it wants to undertake and must provide assurances that Hamas will not profit or benefit from the construction in any way. Jerusalem has no control, however, over the bidding process and how companies are chosen by UNRWA to carry out the projects. The Israelis try as much as possible to pressure UNRWA to scrutinize and vet the contractors to ensure that Hamas is not involved with the companies that gain the contracts, but they cannot strictly supervise this.
In the West Bank, there is daily liaison and coordination between the Israeli authorities and UNRWA, which in general work well. For the most part, there are no special problems in issuing permits for transporting local products or in the coordination of movements, treatment of special cases in times of border closures or security tensions, as well as supplying materials, food, and medical goods. There is also a mechanism for special humanitarian requests or needs that is activated on a regular basis.
A Marriage of Convenience
This view of the marginally better option of working with UNRWA is formalized through the activities of the Israeli office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit (COGAT)—a bureau of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and a part of the General Staff. Its mandate is to implement "civilian policy of the government of Israel in the West Bank and vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip in coordination and conjunction with the prime minister's office, other government ministries, the security forces, and the IDF General Staff."[15] It is in charge of cooperation with international agencies operating outside the territory of pre-1967 Israel and attempts to maintain a good working relationship with UNRWA, mainly to help the agency perform its task of providing vital services to the Palestinian Arabs.
As such, COGAT is a forum that irons out differences and solves problems as they arise in the field. From June 1967 until the signing of the DOP, the West Bank and Gaza were under Israel's military administration. Subsequently, COGAT replaced the military administration in response to the political maneuvering of Arafat, who sought to internationalize the Palestinian-Israeli conflict so as to enhance his personal standing and place Israel under growing international pressure.
At that time, Israel strongly objected to Arafat's efforts to internationalize the conflict; yet after his death and succession by Mahmoud Abbas, and especially in the years following Operation Cast Lead, Israel's policy became more receptive to the prominent role played by UNRWA, the UNDP, and other international nongovernmental organizations in Palestinian education, health, and welfare.
What this means in practical terms is that COGAT works with UNRWA to develop agreed-upon coordinating mechanisms for the transport of goods for the agency's facilities in the West Bank as well as for the transfer of building materials, food, and medical supplies through Israeli checkpoints at the border with Gaza. Other areas of cooperation include facilitating the movement of local staff as well as releasing goods from Israeli ports. However, materials of dual use are not allowed to enter Gaza, and a list of those items is readily available to anyone.
One sphere of extensive cooperation has been in the area of education where UNRWA claims to serve the educational needs of 213,000 Gazan children[16] and 52,633 pupils in the West Bank.[17] Despite COGAT's recent permission to launch 110 new construction sites, including schools and health clinics, UNRWA still lamented: "Years of underfunding have left the education system in Gaza overstretched, with 94 percent of schools operating on a double-shift basis, hosting one 'school' of students in the morning and a different group in the afternoon."[18] However, Israel is not involved in UNRWA's internal technical issues. In addition, the agency is seeking to implement a "Special Children, Special Needs" program to provide dedicated teams of pediatricians, nurses, and counselors to address medical problems, psychosocial issues, and socioeconomic challenges of the estimated 13,000 special-needs children; it also announced a project to promote basic human rights, teaching "nonviolence … conflict resolution and … the importance of tolerance."[19]
The Israeli government supports these educational programs because it is strongly averse to the other alternative: Palestinian children attending Hamas schools in both Gaza and the West Banks.[20] Jerusalem believes that, for all of Hamas' penetration of the UNRWA school system,[21] children educated in UNRWA's schools are indoctrinated to a lesser extent with anti-Israel and anti-Semitic hatred than those attending Hamas' own schools,[22] which appear to be little more than hotbeds for terrorism and violence.[23]
The established working relationship between Israel and UNRWA largely bypasses the PA and Hamas. On the face of it, it would have been beneficial to Israel if UNRWA's operations were to be entirely transferred to the PA, thus reducing the influence of one of the foremost international perpetuators of the Palestinian refugee myth and underscoring the fact that the "refugees" are now settled in their West Bank or Gaza homeland. In practice, Jerusalem seems perfectly content to sustain the modus operandi with UNRWA and to leave negotiations over the final settlement of the refugee problem until such time as a lasting peace settlement is reached.
・Baruch Spiegel is a retired brigadier general in the Israel Defense Forces and former deputy head of the office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, who served as a senior consultant for several Israeli ministers of defense and as special advisor for regional affairs for President Shimon Peres.
[1] Alexander Bligh, "From UNRWA to Israel: The 1952 Transfer of Responsibilities for Refugees in Israel,"Refuge, Nov. 1994, pp. 7-10, 24.
[2] Michael Comay and Lawrence Michelmore, exchange of letters, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, June 14, 1967.
[3] U.S. House of Representatives, H. Con. res. 29, 111th Congress, 1st sess., Jan. 28, 2009.
[4] Ibid.; Asaf Romirowsky, "How UNRWA Supports Hamas," inFocus Quarterly, Fall 2007; Claudia Rosett, "Gaza Bedfellows: UNRWA and Hamas," Forbes.com, Jan. 8, 2009.
[5] U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) A/66/13 (Supp), Mar. 31, 2011.
[6] Mitchell Bard, "The Palestinian Refugees," Jewish Virtual Library, accessed June 25, 2012.
[7] U.N. Dept. of Public Information, UNGA/SPD/336, Nov. 14, 2005.
[8] "Rocket Attacks on Israel from Gaza," Israel Defense Forces, Jerusalem, June 23, 2012.
[9] "Using civilians as human shields," Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC), Ramat Hasharon, Mar. 25, 2009.
[10] I. Zagout, "March 2008 Monthly Report," UNRWA Community Mental Health Programme, cited in "Health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory, including east Jerusalem and in the occupied Syrian Golan," World Health Organization, A62/INF.DOC./2, May 14, 2009, p. 9.
[11] "Increased humanitarian aid to Gaza after IDF operation, Jan. 2009," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, June 26, 2010; "Increased Humanitarian Aid to Gaza after IDF Operation," ReliefWeb, May 30, 2009.
[12] The Jerusalem Post, Oct. 22, 2010.
[13] "121 projects to improve quality of life in Gaza Strip," News Channels, Israel Defense Forces, Apr. 4, 2011.
[14] "Israel approves new package of UN projects for Gaza," U.N. press release, Brussels, Mar. 21, 2012.
[15] "Who we are," Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit, accessed June 26, 2012.
[16] "UNRWA: Gaza blockade anniversary report," UNRWA, Jerusalem, June 13, 2011.
[17] "West Bank," UNRWA website, accessed July 16, 2012.
[18] "Programmes in Gaza," UNRWA website, accessed June 14, 2012.
[19] "Human rights promotion," UNRWA website, accessed June 14, 2012.
[20] The Washington Times, June 13, 2007.
[21] See, for example, Arlene Kushner, "UNRWA: Protesting Too Much," American Thinker, June 17, 2011; idem, "UNRWA Association with Hamas: An Overview," The Center for Near East Policy Research, Ltd., Jerusalem, accessed June 26, 2012.
[22] See, for example, The Jerusalem Post, Mar. 1, 2011.
[23] Matthew Levitt, "Hamas from Cradle to Grave," Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2004, pp. 3-15.
©1994-2012 The Middle East Forum
２．Middle East Forum（http://www.meforum.org/3374/is-j-street-winning）
Is J Street Winning?
by Steven J. Rosen
Foreign Policy
November 9, 2012
Will there be a tectonic shift in attitudes toward the Middle East among Democrats in the next Congress?
Gone will be many Democratic heavyweights who could be counted as loyal supporters of the pro-Israel cause. Howard Berman, ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was defeated by Brad Sherman in an intraparty race; Shelley Berkley resigned from the House to pursue a failed Senate campaign; Rep. Steve Rothman was defeated by Rep. Bill Pascrell in the Democratic primary; Sen. Joe Lieberman declined to run again; Gary Ackerman, ranking Democrat on the House Mideast subcommittee, retired rather than face a bitter primary fight; and Rep. Barney Frank retired. Entering Congress, meanwhile, is a new class of Democrats with weaker ties to Israel, such as Tammy Baldwin (previously a member of the House), Ann McLane Kuster, and Tammy Duckworth.
J Street, an organization highly critical of Israeli policies, is hailing the election results as "an incredible victory" and "part of transforming the political atmosphere around Israel in the U.S." The 113th Congress, according to J Street's statistics, will include 50 percent more members endorsed by JStreetPAC, its political action committee (PAC), than the 112th. All 49 JStreetPAC-endorsed incumbents in the House and seven JStreetPAC-endorsed Senate candidates were reelected, while its challengers and candidates for open seats won 14 out of 15 races. J Street is also boasting that it helped defeat five hard-line pro-Israel Republican House members: Joe Walsh, Allen West, Bobby Schilling, Frank Guinta, and Ann Marie Buerkle.
However, J Street's political victory is not nearly so sweeping as it would have observers believe. Almost all the Democratic candidates the group supported were also supported by AIPAC-inspired PACs and individuals affiliated with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. According to AIPAC insiders, the AIPAC-inspired donations to these Democrats in most cases dwarfed the $1.8 million raised by JStreetPAC. (Unlike J Street, AIPAC does not have a directly affiliated PAC and does not publish numbers for PACs known to be friendly toward the organization.) AIPAC staff and volunteers have long been engaged with the same Democratic incumbents and challengers, and it has secured pro-Israel position papers from them. AIPAC will also be far more influential than J Street in influencing coming committee and leadership assignments that go to select Democrats.
But it is true that more funds are being raised today than ever before from donors who depict Israel as the obstacle to peace and favor U.S. pressure to force Israeli concessions. The campaign contributions put muscle behind a flood of articles and speeches that portray Israel as a strategic liability rather than an asset -- a trigger-happy country that exaggerates the Iranian threat and is plotting the annexation of the West Bank at the expense of the Palestinians.
Spokesmen for this view, like author Peter Beinart and J Street President Jeremy Ben-Ami, are taking ideas from the far left of the Israeli political spectrum and transforming them into mainstream beliefs of the Democratic Party. Meanwhile, however, their counterparts in Israel have shrunk to insignificance: Meretz, the party of Peace Now and Yossi Beilin, has contracted from 14 seats in the Knesset to a mere three. Shelly Yachimovich, the new head of the Labor Party and informal leader of the Israeli opposition, has resisted fierce pressure to embrace the Beilinist agenda. The vast majority of the Israeli public has spoken, and it has rejected the ideology these critics are bringing to the United States.
But in America, these voices have found fertile ground. The American Jewish community is on average more liberal and more dovish on the Middle East than the Jewish majority in Israel. Reform temples and college campuses are particularly receptive to Beinart and Ben-Ami's message.
As a result, these ideas are moving gradually from the far left to the center-left of the Democratic base. And as the older generation of Democratic stalwarts gradually passes from the scene and new Democrats to the left of their predecessors enter the House and Senate and slowly climb the ranks, there will be an evolution within the Democratic Party.
Trends on the Republican side generally go in the opposite direction. Twenty years ago, the party was split between the "Reagan Republicans," who were ardently pro-Israel, and old liners like Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, and the nativist Pat Buchanan, who had a far more skeptical attitude. Today, the movement conservatives are in almost complete control, and stalwart support for Israel is the norm among Republicans.
That fact, however, will only come as slight consolation to AIPAC and successive Israeli governments, which have struggled for decades to prevent support for the Jewish state from becoming a partisan issue. So far they have succeeded: In fact, AIPAC is still producing record-breaking bipartisan majorities on pro-Israel legislation, with more Democrats than ever in support.
But there is no guarantee this state of affairs will continue forever, and we could be witnessing the first rumblings of a gradual shift today. A change is taking place under the surface inside the Democratic Party, and it is bound to burst out into the open at key moments down the road.
・Steven J. Rosen served for 23 years as a senior official of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and is now director of the Washington Project of the Middle East Forum.
３．Los Angeles Times（http://touch.latimes.com）
Israel historian Benny Morris responds to critics left and right, 9 November 2012
Lefteris Pitarakis / Associated Press
Israeli historian Benny Morris in 2001. "My historical views haven’t changed at all... But my political views have changed," he said recently.
by Edmund Sanders, Los Angeles Times
JERUSALEM — Historian Benny Morris has a knack for enraging Israelis of every political stripe.
Morris' research on the 1948 war for independence challenged long-standing Zionist narratives that said Israel was not responsible for the creation of 750,000 Palestinian refugees. He infuriated right-wing Israelis by documenting secret plans to expel Arabs and accounts of massacres and rapes by Jewish forces.
Then a few years ago, he turned his critical eye toward Palestinians, holding them largely responsible for stalled peace talks.
Morris shocked many leftist fans with his harsh — some said racist — comments about what he called Palestinians' cultural deficiencies and lack of respect for the rule of law. The biggest problem with Israel's expulsions of Arabs in 1948, he said, was that it didn't go all the way.
In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, Morris, 63, insists he has no regrets.
You've scoffed at the fuss made about your supposed "right-wing conversion," but haven't you changed your views?
My historical views haven't changed at all, and my historical writing remains the same, for good or ill. In fact, my second book on the Palestinian refugee problem, which came out in 2004, has got material that is unpleasant for Israelis to read. But my political views have changed. In the 1990s I was cautiously optimistic that the Palestinians were changing their tune and becoming agreeable to a two-state solution. [The late Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat seemed to signal this with the Oslo process. Before the 1980s, they just talked about destroying Israel.
So what changed your mind?
By 2000, two things changed to make me deeply pessimistic. Arafat rejected the two-state proposal put on the table by [former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Barak and [former U.S. President] Clinton, and then the launching of the second intifada. The other thing was, I was looking at the whole conflict for a book I was writing at the time and I saw the monotony and consistency of the Palestinian stance, and their unflinching desire for all of [historic] Palestine [including Israel].
The intransigence of Palestinians made you right-wing?
I don't see myself as right-wing. I believe in a two-state solution.
Is that still enough in Israel to make someone left-wing?
A two-state solution is basically the litmus test of the left and right.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu endorsed a two-state solution. Is he left-wing?
He offered lip service. But he wasn't an espouser of two-state for many years. I've always supported two states and been against the settlement venture in the West Bank. I don't think I'm a right-winger. But I wouldn't say I'm a wild left-winger, either.
A lot of liberals would agree, based on some of the controversial things you've said about Arabs being incapable of democracy, not respecting the rule of law or sanctity of life.
Also the treatment of women, treatment of homosexuals. I've got a whole list.
Have you seen anything in the "Arab Spring" that leads you to rethink that?
It's only made things worse. The Arab Spring gave more of a voice to the Arab street than it's ever had. You could call that moving in the direction of democracy. But what ended up happening was that the Arab street was basically Islamic fundamentalist. That's what came out of the elections in Egypt, in Tunis. And that's what's probably happening in Syria. These people hate democracy. They will only use it get to power.
You don't see Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas as a partner, particularly with his recent comments disavowing violence, recognizing Israel's 1948 borders and saying he has no personal expectation for a right of return?
Abbas is not simplistic. He's disavowed violence since the second intifada. On the other hand, he didn't exactly protest when Arafat said no to the peace process. Abbas believes in the diplomatic way. But what I think he really wants is all of Palestine.
After your work about the plight of Palestinians, you were ostracized by the right. Has that changed? And how does the left view you now?
I'm still ostracized by the right. The other side regards me as a traitor because I was in some way supposed to be an icon of the left and was writing history that served leftist purposes. Then here I was attacking Palestinians and saying they never wanted peace and want to destroy Israel.
Some see a contradiction between your historical documentation about brutal Israeli attacks against Palestinians in 1948 and your equally harsh criticism about Palestinians.
I write history. A historian is supposed to write the truth about what the documents tell him. Some people say the things I wrote were subversive against Zionism because they showed Jews behaving badly. I don't think that's subversive. I think the truth is good.
As a Zionist, weren't you tempted to suppress information for the good of Israel?
No. If I wanted to not write the truth, I'd go work for the Foreign Ministry propaganda department. But in a sense, I made amends by later writing an entire history of the 1948 war. When you look at the whole war, the Palestinian refugee problem is much more intelligible and less brutal. You can see clearly it was a product of self-defense. Arabs attacked Jews and the Jews had to clear the roads and border areas because the Arab armies were about to invade. Certain actions were necessary if Israel wanted to survive.
Survive or form a state?
It's the same thing, at least as the Israelis saw it in 1948. Three years after the Holocaust, you have to give the Israelis the right to feel that when the Arabs were shouting bloody murder on the radio, they meant it. They felt that if the Arabs had won, they would have killed everybody.
One of your most depressing recent conclusions is that there's no hope at this time for a resolution. Will Obama's reelection change that?
That's a question. Some say he got burned in his first term. Others say now that he doesn't need to get reelected, he can put more pressure on Israel, which is something Israeli leaders fear, and on Palestinians. I'm hopeful there will be a renewal of negotiations, but my fear is that it won't go anywhere because Palestinians, deep in their heart, don't want a negotiated peace.
Then what's the point of talks?
Negotiations can take the edge off antagonism. Sometimes the process can lead people to places they didn't expect to go.
・edmund.sanders@latimes.com
４．Tablet Mag（http://www.tabletmag.com）
Arab Upheaval Reaches Israel, 14 November 2012
The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the civil war in Syria are bringing violence to Israel’s borders
by Jonathan Spyer
This week, Israel found itself targeted yet again: Missile and rocket attacks from Hamas-controlled Gaza terrorized Israelis living in towns and cities in the Negev, while on the northern border, the IDF fired a warning missile at Syria after apparently misdirected Syrian mortar fire hit the Golan Heights. The situations in Gaza and Syria are quite different, but the details of the two combined add up to picture of Israel’s dramatically changed strategic situation as a result of the upheavals in the Arab world and the advance of Sunni Islamism. These developments are heating up formerly quiet borders—and adding new, worrying dimensions to long-standing conflicts.
Though civil war has raged in Syria for 20 months, Sunday marked the first time that the conflict spilled over into Israel—and the first direct engagement of Syrian ground forces by the IDF from the Golan Heights since the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Since that year, the border has been one of Israel’s quietest. But this week, in response to mortar shells that hit the religious farming community of Alonei Bashan, Israeli gunners fired a Tammuz missile at Syrian government forces near Bir al-Ajami on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights. Then, following an additional Syrian mortar shell on Israeli soil on Monday, Israeli tanks targeted the mobile battery that had fired the mortar, injuring two Syrian soldiers.
In the south, this year has seen the highest volume of rocket attacks targeting Israeli communities since Operation Cast Lead in the winter of 2008-2009. Since January 2012, 858 rockets and mortar shells have hit Israel, compared to 676 in 2011, 357 in 2010, and 317 following Cast Lead in 2009. The deterrence gained by the IDF as a result of the operation appears to be diminishing with time, and the presence of a Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt is probably also contributing to Hamas’ increased boldness in Gaza.
At first blush, neither case represents a moment of supreme crisis. Israeli authorities are convinced that the stray bullets and mortar shells coming from Syria across the Golan are the result of the intensifying combat within that country rather than any attempt by the Syrian regime to draw Israel into the war. Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon told Israeli Army Radio Monday, “In my estimation, there is almost no doubt that (Assad) has no interest in opening a front. … All he needs now would be for us to hit him.”
Israel has now made clear to Assad that further incidents of this type will result in an Israeli response. As Ya’alon put it: “There were five incidents of supposed errant fire from small arms or mortars. We sent verbal messages. This didn’t help. So, yesterday, for the first time, we sent a physical message. If the message was understood, good. If the message was not understood, we will need to send other messages of the kind.”
In the South, Defense Minister Ehud Barak made clear on Tuesday that the current round of violence is not yet over. “Hamas and the other terrorist organizations are suffering as a result of intense strikes by the IDF in Gaza,” Barak said. “But it is certainly not over, and we will decide how and when to act if necessary.”
At this stage, any harsher Israeli response is likely to be carefully calibrated. Israel has a range of options that fall short of a paradigm-shifting major ground operation into the Strip. Airstrikes targeting Hamas facilities in response to missile attacks, which have gone on since Cast Lead, will continue. Targeting Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamist military figures may re-commence. A limited ground offensive is also an option, but it appears less likely. A major operation to unseat Hamas rule in Gaza, or even an operation at the scale of Cast Lead, remains extremely unlikely under present circumstances.
In Gaza, Sinai, and Syria, the increasing chaos is the result of a single, regional process: namely, the replacement of rotting secular Arab regimes by an energized Sunni Islamism.
In Syria, despite superior weaponry and continued support from Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, Assad is losing ground. The strongman has money, weaponry, and international support—everything he needs for survival except for one crucial factor: people. The dictator has a steadily depleting number of men willing to risk their lives on his behalf.
This absence of reliable manpower has caused Assad to cede much of the north of Syria, and the rebels are increasing the tempo of fighting in the area south of Damascus. As the intensity of the combat in Syria’s south increases, so increases the possibility of stray shells finding their way over the border into Israel (as has happened with Turkey to Syria’s north).
The rebels remain a disparate, disunited bunch. But the Syrian insurgency is overwhelmingly Sunni, mainly rural, and devout. The growing force within it, supported by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, is Sunni Islamism. The statements from Free Syrian Army commanders condemning Israel’s warning shots and claiming, absurdly, that Israel had engaged on behalf of the regime have reminded Israeli policymakers that Israel has no friends on either side of the Syrian civil war. And whatever the outcome of the Syrian civil war, this new volatility is unlikely to subside for a long period to come.
To Israel’s south, the situation is defined by the advance of the Muslim Brotherhood—in Egypt, and in Gaza, in the guise of the group’s Palestinian franchise, Hamas. The presence of a Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt makes the notion of a major Israeli incursion into Gaza more problematic and fraught with potential dangers. Plus, at least for now, Israel considers it to be a strategic interest to prop up the shaky foundations of the peace treaty with Egypt.
All this means that the current round of violence in Gaza is likely eventually to subside back into another round of temporary, ambiguous, and relative quiet.
It’s hard to see anything optimistic in the current situation. And yet, from Israel’s point of view, one positive side effect of the rise of Sunni Islamism is the relative weakening of the Shia power of Iran. Hamas, once a client of Iran, has deserted its former patron, seeking an alliance with Sunni Egypt. The Syrian rebels, too, despise Iran, which is the main backer of the Assad regime. The key question is whether Sunni Islamist power, once it crystallizes, will prove an equally formidable challenge to Israel as is the Shia, Iran-led bloc, or whether the Sunni Islamists will prefer to focus on internal matters (and settling accounts with the Shia).
Either way, the events of the past few days on Israel’s borders have made it clear that the changing Arab political order is dictating the nature of events. The secular dictatorships that Israel vanquished on the field of battle a generation ago have departed or are departing the stage. Sunni Islamist forces are the inheritor. The result: renewed disorder and the challenging task facing the IDF of building renewed deterrence.
５．The Star Online（http://thestar.com.my）
Malaysia condemns Israeli attacks on Gaza, calls for UN action, 15 November 2012
KUALA LUMPUR: Malaysia has urged the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, to take immediate resolute action over what it called irresponsible military action by Israel against innocent civilians in Gaza.
Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Anifah Aman said Malaysia condemned in the strongest terms the continuing Israeli military assaults and air strikes on Gaza, which have led to the deaths of a Palestinian leader and seven others, including two children.
"Malaysia urges all parties involved to stop any provocative action, remain calm and exercise restraint to avoid greater damage and loss of life, especially among the civilian population in the Gaza Strip," he said in a statement on Thursday.
Malaysia also demanded that Israel immediately cease its military aggression towards the Palestinian people, he added. -Bernama
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