I received two mails from Dr. Ng Kam Weng, Director of Kairos Research Centre in Malaysia yesterday and today. He worries about the Muslim scholars' inaccuracy in their discussions and un-scholastic attitudes regarding the 'Allah' issue. (Lily)
Krisis & Praxis (http://www.krisispraxis.com)
(1) Refutation of Muslim Scholars’ Arguments in the Allah Controversy. Part 1/3, 28 June 2010
by Kam Weng
Refutation of Muslim Scholars’ Arguments in the Allah Controversy.
Part 1/3 (Part One of Three Parts)
The Court of Appeal may appear tardy in taking up its review of the High Court decision that ruled in favour of the Catholic Herald (and Christians) concerning the right to use the word Allah. However, the government has been actively mobilizing its scholars to disseminate arguments to buttress its position of banning Christians from using the word Allah. Presumably, their arguments will influence judges to favor the government in future hearings in the Courts .
I shall focus only on the more significant Muslim scholars whose articles have been frequently posted in the Muslim blogs:
1) Dr. Syed Ali Tawfik Al-Attas, Director General of Institute of Islamic Understanding (IKIM) and Dr. Mohd Sani b. Badron (Director, Centre for Economics and Social Studies (IKIM), “Heresy Arises from Words Wrongly Used”:
http://www.ikim.gov.my/v5/index.php?lg=1&opt=com_article&grp=2&sec=&key=1989&cmd=resetall
I shall also make reference to another article by Dr. Mohd Sani b. Badron, “Nama Khas “Allah”: Persoalan dan Penyelesaian ” published at IKIM Website: http://www.ikim.gov.my/v5/index.php?lg=1&opt=com_article&grp=2&sec=&key=2017&cmd=resetall
2) Prof Madya Dr. Khadijah Mohd Hambali, Jabatan Akidah dan Pemikiran Islam, Akademi Pengajian Islam, University Malaya, “Perbezaan Penggunaan Kalima Allah Dalam Agama Islam Dan Agama Kristian.”: http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/20904801/534162226/name/KALIMAH_ALLAH-DR_KHADIJAH_MOHD_HAMBALI.doc
3) Mohd Aizam bin Mas’od (Department of Islamic Development, JAKIM), “Hujan Menolak Penggunaan Kalimah ‘Allah’ Oleh Kristian.”:
http://www.islam.gov.my/ajaransesat/pdf/Hujah%20Tolak%20Guna%20Allah%20oleh%20Kristian.pdf
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I begin by responding to the article that gives the most scholarly appearance (please see the text given at the end of this post).
Response to Dr. Tawfik al-Attas and Mohd Sani’s article:
Despite its scholarly appearance, the article does not contain much research. Of course, one reads citations of medieval authorities like Peter Lombard, Jerome, Hilary of Poitiers, Augustine and John Damascene (St. John of Damascus). But the citations evidently do not arise from a firsthand familiarity with these medieval scholars. The writers merely paraphrase the words of Aquinas found in the Summa Theologiae ST Book 1, Question 13 and 31.
Their suggestion that we need to use words carefully is taken from Aquinas who in the context warns readers to beware of two opposite errors, that is, Arianism and Sabellianism.
Aquinas writes, “Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of essence: we may, however, use the term “distinction” on account of the relative opposition.”He adds, “To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term “singularity,” lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence (ST Book 1.31.2).”
But Dr. Tawfik Al-Attas and Dr. Mohd Sani themselves fail to maintain the balance. It is rather the case of misusing Aquinas when they cite his advice to Christians not to use the word ‘singular’. Indeed, they misuse of Aquinas to frame an unrelated argument which I have reconstructed to help the reader make sense of what is otherwise a very jumbled-up article.
1) Allâh refers to a singular God
2) St. Hilary of Poitiers and Aquinas advised Christians to avoid the term ‘singular’ God that takes away the notion of number of Divine Persons (triune God)
3) Christians are using Allâh for the triune God
4) Christians contradict Aquinas the foremost Western theologian of the Church
5) Christians are presumed to be in error in using Allâh when they contradict their foremost theologian.
Tawfik and Mohd Sani resort to equivocation and jumbling of Aquinas words to suit their argument.
A careful reading of the context shows that when Aquinas says we do not use the word ‘only’ (Latin unici), he is saying we cannot just reduce God to singularity or we do not use the word ‘singularity’ for a triune God, as there must be a delicate balance of unity and trinity when we refer to God. Aquinas precisely specifies the balance: “We do not say the only God….The term solitary is also to be avoided, lest we take away the society of the three persons.” The reason is that because in God distinction is by the Persons and not by essence.”
I give the full quotation of Aquinas so that the reader can follow accurately his careful analysis that maintains the fine balance between unity and trinity:
“To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term “singularity,” lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii): “It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son are separate in Godhead.” We must avoid the adjective “only” [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary says in the same book: “We exclude from God the idea of singularity or uniqueness.” Nevertheless, we say “the only Son,” for in God there is no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say “the only God,” for the Deity is common to several. We avoid the word “confused,” lest we take away from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence, Ambrose says (De Fide i): “What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity where there is no difference.” The word “solitary” is also to be avoided, lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says (De Trin. iv), “We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God (ST Book 1.31.2).”
Tawfik and Mohd Sani both read Aquinas carelessly when they rely on partial quotations of Aquinas that violate his precise balance. It is an illegitimate attempt to co-op Aquinas for their argument (1) – (5). Aquinas is talking about maintaining balance between unity and trinity; he is not in anyway disqualifying Christians from referring to the one God .
The second part of argument by Tawfik and Mohd Sani I reconstruct as follows:
1) God is an appellative noun
2) Appellative nouns are common nouns
3) Allâh is a proper noun/personal name
4) Therefore God cannot be substituted with the word Allâh [Proper nouns have specific reference but common nouns have general reference (2) and (3) cannot go together]
5) Christians cannot call their God Allâh
Tawfik and Mohd Sani commit another error in misreading and misusing Aquinas. Obviously they fail to follow through the structure and logic of Aquinas’ writing. They cite St John of Dasmacus /Damascene to suggest the root word of God (Latin theo) merely describes divine action or activities. Citing Aquinas’ use of St. John of Damascus would certainly impressed Christians who look to the early theologians as authority in theology. Unfortunately, they simply got Aquinas upside down. They simply fail to do justice to the immediate context.
Here is how Tawfik and Mohd Sani again misuse Aquinas. They begin with a skewed quotation of St. John of Damascus:
“Now, according to St John of Damascus, the term God in Greek as well as in Latin (theo) is a derivative, from either of these three root-words. It is either from a particular word which means “to cherish all things”, or from another word which means “to burn” (for the Christian God is “a consuming fire”, according to St John), or from another word which means “to consider all things”.
Marshalling his argument on that premise, Aquinas concluded that the name God in this context is not a proper noun. On the contrary, it is an appellative noun, or a title, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor, either in the sense that He is the “Cherisher”, the “Taker of account of everything”, or the “Comprehender of everything”, and so on.”
Tawfik and Mohd Sani are right when they cite Aquinas as saying the name God in this context is not a proper name and it is an appellative noun. But their appeal to St. John of Damascus is simply irrelevant (which I assume is cited only to give an impression of scholarship). Aquinas is not using St John of Damascus to support his theological position.
The structure of discussion in the Summa goes as follows. First, Aquinas cites a) a series of objections from earlier scholars, usually including quotations from them; he then follows with (b) a short rebuttal and then (c) proceeds to give a point by point refutation of the earlier list of objections.
The alert reader would notice that Aquinas is citing St. John of Damascus in the section comprising (a) a series of objections; he then follows with (b) a short rebuttal.
How strange it is when Tawfik and Mohd Sani relies on part (a) to enlist Aquinas to their side when in fact Aquinas cites part (a) in order to refute it. Aquinas was in fact setting up St John of Damascus for a rebuttal (that is the normal structure of Aquinas’ argument/presentation).
First Aquinas gives the objection by St. John Damascus:
Objection 1: It seems that this name, “God,” is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that “God {Theos} is so called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our God is a fire consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things.” But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name “God” signifies His operation and not His nature.
Aquinas proceeds the rebuttal as follows:
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that “God” is a name of the nature.
I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone’s substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same (ST Book 1.8.8).
The moral of my analysis of Tawfik and Mohd Sani is – do not be mislead by appearance of scholarship. Check the original sources. Special care is needed when we engage such a sophisticated mind like Thomas Aquinas to ensure accuracy when presenting his definitions, analysis and arguments. Obvious, checking the original sources shows that Tawfik and Mohd Sani grievously misinterpret, mishandle and misuse Aquinas.
How could Tawfik and Mohd Sani who have good academic credentials get Aquinas so wrong? Perhaps they thought they could simply hijack Aquinas for their ideological purpose, that is, to give a superficial intellectual gloss over the ridiculous government action to ban Christians from using the word Allah. Unfortunately, the evident errors decisively undermine their spurious argument against Christians using the word Allâh.
My immediate purpose in part 1/3 is to focus on how Tawfik and Mohd Sani misuse Aquinas.
The second part of their article is premised on the debatable claim that Allah is a proper noun. I shall give conclusive evidence and a strong demonstration in the part 2/3 for the case that Allah is not a proper noun, much less a personal name. That being the case, Tawfik and Mohd Sani are wrong when they assume that when God is used an appellative noun, it cannot have a specific reference. The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines an appellative as follows, “a common noun, such as ‘doctor’, ‘mother’ or ‘sir’, used as a vocative.”
That is to say, even though the word God is not a proper noun, it can have an appellative function that goes beyond general description and provides a direct reference. Indeed, the word Allâh may be used in an appellative sense.
Both Mohd Sani Badron and Khadijah (whose article will be dealt with later) are confused when they appeal to a subjective meaning (connotation) to override the primary meaning of Allâh as a common noun. At best they may claim that Allâh can subjectively connote a specific reference, but objectively the word denotes just a supreme God without any exclusive reference or exclusive description.
More to come in Part 2
Full text of article by Datuk Dr. Syed Ali Tawfik Al-Attas/ Dr. Mohd Sani b. Badron
Heresy Arises From Words Wrongly Used Datuk Dr. Syed Ali Tawfik Al-Attas/ Dr. Mohd Sani b. Badron Mantan Ketua Pengarah/ Fellow Kanan Published at IKIM Website on the 20th February 2008: http://www.ikim.gov.my/v5/index.php?lg=1&opt=com_article&grp=2&sec=&key=1989&cmd=resetall
It was reported that Peter Lombard’s Four Books of Sentences recorded the following concern of Jerome, on “heresy arises from words wrongly used”.
Those remarks by St Jerome of Stridonium (d. 420), who was regarded as the most learned of the Latin Fathers, clearly reflected how paramount the importance of language was for him, particularly in relation to theological matters.
The fact is, that there is a profound connection between language and reason, as words and terms connote what is conceptualized or understood by the mind.
To quote Prof. Dr. Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas’s latest work Tinjauan Ringkas Peri Ilmu dan Pandangan Alam (Penang: USM, 2007), “bahasa merupakan alat akal fikri yang sekaligus juga mempengaruhi pemikiran si penggunanya.” That is to say, “language is the instrument of reason which influences the reasoning of its users.” For one may well ask, what is the purpose of language if not to make true meanings of words become intelligible to the mind? And as such, what is the fundamental purpose of language if not to project the worldview of its users in a faithful manner?
Because using language correctly is a cognitive action, it is imperative for its users to be meticulous in its “correct usage” as well as in the pursuit of its “authentic meaning”.
As far as fundamental religious matters are concerned, to use language incorrectly introduces confusion to the minds of its users. Words wrongly used will inevitably impinge upon semantic change in theological concepts and the way one views reality and truth. Hence the pressing need to exercise constant vigilance in detecting erroneous linguistic usage.
In the Christian context, it is in order to avoid such heresy arising from the erroneous use of words and terms that St Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) said this in his Summa Theologica: “when we speak of the Trinity we must proceed with care”. As if anticipating detractors who would argue that the quest for right words in divine matters is “toilsome”, Aquinas insisted that it was well worth the effort. St Augustine (d. 430), who was arguably the most important Christian thinker after St Paul, said that in comparison to the wrong usage of words in theology, “nowhere is error more harmful”.
Following another eminent doctor of the Western Church, St Hilary of Poitiers (d. c. 367), Aquinas advised Christians to shun the term the “singular” God, as that would exclude their notion of God whose essence is common to the three distinct Hypostases.
Likewise, Aquinas advised Christians to avoid the term the “only” God, as the adjective “only” (Latin unici) would take away their notion of the number of Divine Persons. In Aquinas’s words, “We do not say ‘the only God,’ for Deity is common to many”; referring to their belief that Deity is common to the three co-eternal Persons: the Father, the only-begotten Son, the Holy Ghost.
Naturally, I find that there are many contradictions between what was advised by Aquinas, who was the foremost Western theologian of the Church, with the concerns of a few Malaysian Christian leaders recently highlighted in our media.
While Aquinas advised his co-religionists to exclude from God the idea of “singularity” or “uniqueness”, a few Christians in Malaysia (or in any country for that matter) insist on translating their notion of triune God using the term Allah.
But there is a fundamental issue they have to address first without confusing themselves and creating linguistic anarchy, because among the firmly integral purports of the term Allah are al-Ahad (the Absolute One), al-Wahid (the Absolute Unique) and al-Witr (the Absolute Singular, the Sole, the Unequalled) Who has no son, nor father, nor partner, nor likeness. These purports have been mentioned by way of describing who Allah is in the Qur’an as well as in its interpretation by the authentic traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, who is, for that matter, considered by experts as the most eloquent of the Arabs.
In order for us to see how those two worldviews are contrasted to each other, and hence to be careful in our translation, it is sufficient to compare the abovementioned statement on God by Aquinas with the following.
Commenting on the meaning of al-Wahid al-Ahad, Muhyiddin Ibn al-‘Arabi (d. 1240) had simply this to say in his Futuhat Makkiyyah: “Allah is the Unique, the Absolute One with respect to His godhead, there is no God (Ilah) except He.”
As far as the authentic meaning and correct usage of the term Allah throughout the ages are concerned, the Tahdhib of al-Azhari (d. 980) and the Lisan al-‘Arab of Ibn Manzur (d. 1311) have documented that, excepting Allah, there is no being to whom the purports of al-Wahid and al-Ahad are applicable together, or to whom al-Ahad is applicable alone. “Verily, I,-I alone-am Allah: there is no God (Ilah) but I: therefore worship Me” (the Qur’an, Ta Ha, 20: 14).
That is why the term Allah is a proper name which is never shared by others throughout the history of language. The term Allah is not “communicable both in reality and in opinion”, if we want to use Aquinas’s technical terminology.
On the contrary, such terms as Ilah (God in Arabic), Tuhan (God in Malay) or God (in English) are communicable, and have indeed been used to others. Earlier, we have noted Aquinas’s assertion that the term God is common to the three Persons of Trinity; now we will study another crucial passage in his Summa Theologica which explains the statement by an Arab Christian Yahya ibn Mansur al-Dimashqi (d. 749), who was an eastern theological doctor of the Greek and Latin Churches.
Now, according to St John of Damascus, the term God in Greek as well as in Latin (theo) is a derivative, from either of these three root-words. It is either from a particular word which means “to cherish all things”, or from another word which means “to burn” (for the Christian God is “a consuming fire”, according to St John), or from another word which means “to consider all things”.
Marshalling his argument on that premise, Aquinas concluded that the name God in this context is not a proper noun. On the contrary, it is an appellative noun, or a title, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor, either in the sense that He is the “Cherisher”, the “Taker of account of everything”, or the “Comprehender of everything”, and so on.
Aquinas also corroborated his significant conclusion by the fact that the term God has a plural (Gods), as in the Biblical text “God presides in the heavenly council; in the assembly of the Gods he gives his decision…I have said, You are Gods” (Psalms 82.1,6).
Here, the argument on the right to translate a common noun God using the proper noun Allah crumbles; it is only correct to translate God using Tuhan. As far as the proper name Allah is concerned, it has absolutely no plural, reflecting the notion of the One and Only God whose Essence absolutely excludes the purport of consisting of three distinct co-eternal persons, whether in the imagination, in actuality, or in supposition. “Do not say: ‘Trinity’. Desist [from this assertion] it is better for you! Allah is but the Only God (Ilah Wahid); Glory be to Him-that He should have a son!” (the Qur’an, al-Nisa’, 4: 171).
Furthermore, the fact that it is a proper noun alone renders erroneous the critical assumption that the term Allah belongs to a national language and is an Arabic derivative. Indeed, for those who care enough to check the truth, such an absurd claim has long been debunked as inconsistent with the rules of the Arabic language itself by authorities like Ibn al-Barri, al-Layth and al-Khalil (in his Kitab al-‘Ayn).
Al-Zabidi, in his Taj al-‘Arus, remarked that “the most sound view on the name Allah is that it is a proper noun given by the Essence, the Necessary Being. The name Allah combines the attributes of Perfection altogether, it is a non-derivative word.”
Then, al-Zabidi (d. 1790) quotes the authority of Ibn al-‘Arabi, who stated that “the term Allah is a proper name denoting the real and true God (al-Ilah al-Haqq), a denotation that comprises all the Unique most beautiful Divine Names.”
Last but far from least on the “correct usage” and “authentic meaning” of the term Allah, al-Tahanawi (d. 1745), in his dictionary of technical terms relating to metaphysics, the Kashshaf Istilahat al-Funun, stated that “it is inspired to His servants that the name Allah is a proper name of the Essence….The verifiers (al-muhaqqiqun) hold that the name Allah is a non-derivative word; indeed, it is an extemporized proper name (ism murtajal) as it can be described but does not describe.”
(2) Refutation of Muslim Scholars’ Argument in the Allâh Controversy. Part 2/3, 30 June 2010
by Kam Weng
Refutation of Muslim Scholars’ Arguments in the Allah Controversy. Part 2/3
Allâh is Certainly Not a Proper Noun/Personal Name
Introduction: Allâh and Other Loan Words in the Quran for God
The fundamental and contested presupposition in the present dispute on the use of Allâh is whether there are words so exclusively defined by a single linguistic system that their usage is reserved for that linguistic system alone. In this regard, scholars like Dr. Mohd Sani Badron, Prof Khadijah Mohd Hambali and Mohd Aizam operate on the assumption that Quranic Arabic and subsequently, Bahasa Malaysia have sole proprietorship over certain words (especially the word Allâh) since these words been ‘purified’ (Islamicised) for the purpose conveying Islamic truths. As such, they call for Christians to be banned from using the word Allâh as improper usage of the word by Christians will lead to corruption of revealed truth.
Such an assertion is intellectually dubious. It is evident that there is no such thing as a pure language which would presuppose a self-contained and self-sufficient linguistic community, hermetically sealed from interaction with neighboring linguistic communities – a historical impossibility by any account. Indeed, the Arabic language coexisted and dynamically interacted with other cognate Semitic languages like Nabatean, Hebrew and Aramaic (Syraic) in its early history. We only need to point out the phenomenon of loan words in (Quranic) Arabic to prove the point. As the Encyclopedia of the Quran puts it,
From the earliest period of Islam down to the present day, attentive readers have observed that there are words in the Quran which appear to be of non-Arabic origin. (See the entry, “Foreign Vocabulary” written by Andrew Rippin found in Encyclopedia of the Quran vol 2 E- I ed., Jane Dammen McAullife (Brill 2002), pp. 226- 237). An extensive analysis of these loan words that includes zakat, salat, jizyah, hikma, taba, shakina, malik, malak, miskat, masjid, miskin, nabi, wahyu, falak (firmament) etc is found in Arthur Jeffrey,The Foreign Vocabulary of the Quran (Cairo. Oriental Institute Baroda, 1938), pp. 43 – 29.
The word Allâh comes from two words: al, and ilâh. Al is the definite article, and ilâh means strong, god. In Semitic languages, this word refers to a power which is beyond the reach of human beings, a power that belongs to the gods. The words al-ilâh were already combined to become Allâh since the pre-Islamic age. In the religion of the pre-Islamic Arabs, the word was used to denote the highest god among the other gods, each of whom possessed his own name. However, it should be noted that the word Allâh itself is not a name, as will be explained later. It is clear then that the word Allâh was already in use before the arrival of Islam, i.e., even during the so-called ‘time of ignorance’ or the days of polytheism. The word is not a creation of the Muslims and its existence did not begin in Al-qur’ân Al-karîm. From the standpoint of linguistics, it is an common Arabic word which is not specifically linked to a particular religion.
Toshihiko Izutsu remarks that it is precisely because the name Allâh was common to both the pagan Arabs and the Muslims that gave rise to the heated debates that arose between Muhammad and his adversaries. Likewise, Muhammad addressed his adversaries in the name of Allâh without bothering to explain what this name meant, given their common understanding of Allâh as referring to the supreme God [Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Quran, , pp. 100-117].
In the light of the undeniable historical interaction and mutual borrowing of terms between Semitic languages, we can only conclude that Islam cannot exercise monopoly on certain religious terms. One cannot copy-right what was borrowed in the first place.
For fuller discussions please read the following articles:
1) Allâh and Linguistic Hegemony: http://www.krisispraxis.com/archives/2008/01/%E2%80%98allah%E2%80%99-and-linguistic-hegemony/
2) The Semantics of Allâh : http://www.krisispraxis.com/archives/2008/02/the-semantics-of-the-word-Allâh /
3) Allâh is Not a Personal Name :http://www.krisispraxis.com/archives/2009/11/Allâh -is-not-a-definite-name/
4) Foreign Vocabulary and Loan Words in the Quran: Historical Facts :http://www.krisispraxis.com/archives/2010/01/foreign-vocabulary-and-loan-words-in-the-quran-historical-facts/
Refutation of Arguments by Dr. Mohd Sani Badron and Prof. Khadijah Mohd Hanbali
Allâh is Certainly not a Proper Noun/Personal Name
One central pillar in the call for the ban on Christian using the word Allâh is the claim that it is a personal name, that is, it is a name uniquely associated with the God of Islam.
Mohd Sani goes on the offensive with a paragraph under the section, “Beberapa Kesilapan Fakta” in “Nama Khas Allâh .”
Sebegitu dijaga istilah “Allâh ” itu sebagai nama khas, hingga ia tiada gantinya bagi umat Islam sedunia, dari awal sampai bila-bila. Sama ada dalam dialek-dialek Arab, bahasa Farsi, Turki, Cina, Urdu, Eropah, Melayu atau sebagainya, tiada ditemui perkataan yang setara; mencerminkan tiada Hakikat yang setara. “Allâh ” boleh diperikan sebagai “God” contohnya, tetapi “God” tidak boleh diterjemah sebagai “Allâh “. Ini selaras dengan peraturan, nama khas boleh diperikan dengan nama gelaran dan sifat, tetapi nama am tidak boleh sewenang-wenangnya diterjemah kepada nama khas sebagai kata-ganti setara.
Response:
Mohd Sani claims unequivocally that Muslims all over the world use the word Allâh exclusively. However, his claim is misleading. Muslims naturally use the word Allâh , especially in Quranic citations and in liturgical phrases. But Mohd Sani ignores the fact that in daily life, Persians and Pakistanis, and some Turks use the Old Persian word Khudâ (Khoda) to refer to God, a term that is shared by Christians and believers of other religions in these regions. That is to say, both Christians and Muslims in these regions continue to use the name for God that originated from their local contexts even though Muslims use Allâh in Quranic citations and liturgy.
A similar phenomenon can be observed in how new religions in the Nusantara adopted local terms for their religious discourse. For example, Malay was the lingua franca of the Buddhist kingdom of Sri Vijaya. When Buddhism spread it accepted many loan words from Sanskrit. Indeed, present day Muslims have no problem using such loan words like dosa, dukha and syurga and have not make an issue when Malay speaking Christians and Buddhists use these words.
Questionable Claim that Allâh is a Personal Name Based on Arabic Usage
Dr. Mohd Sani Badron claims lexicographical support that Allâh is a proper noun in his article “Nama Khas Allâh ”:
Sebagai nama khas Tuhan Yang Esa, “Allâh ” adalah istilah universal melampaui bangsa, dan bukan bahasa kebangsaan mana-mana bangsa. Sebab itu kamus-kamus yang muktabar mengenai bahasa Qur’ani merakamkan pandangan yang sahih, bahawa istilah “Allâh ” bukan perkataan terbitan daripada bahasa Arab. (Lihat sebagai contoh Kashshaf Istilahat al-Funun, 1: 139.)
The thought is repeated in his English article, “Heresy Arises From Words Wrongly Used”:
Last but far from least on the “correct usage” and “authentic meaning” of the term Allâh , al-Tahanawi (d. 1745), in his dictionary of technical terms relating to metaphysics, the Kashshaf Istilahat al-Funun, stated that “it is inspired to His servants that the name Allâh is a proper name of the Essence….The verifiers (al-muhaqqiqun) hold that the name Allâh is a non-derivative word; indeed, it is an extemporized proper name (ism murtajal) as it can be described but does not describe.”
Of course, Mohd Sani preceeded al-Tanahawi with a citation of Al-Zabidi, “in his Taj al-‘Arus, remarked that “the most sound view on the name Allâh is that it is a proper noun given by the Essence, the Necessary Being. The name Allâh combines the attributes of Perfection altogether, it is a non-derivative word.”
Response:
First, I offer a transliteration and translation of the paragraph of al-Tanahawi that Mohd Sani refers to. On page 321 it is quoted: …Allâhu laisa min al-’asmâ’ ’alatî yajûzu fîhâ ishtiqâq kamâ yajûzu fî r-Rahmân wa-r-Rahîm. Wa-rawâ al-Mundhirî ‘an Abi al-Haitham annahu sa’ala ‘an ishtiqâq ismi llâhi fî l-lughat fa-qâla: kâna haqquhu ’ilâha udkhilat al-alif wa-l-lâm ta’rîfan, fa-qîla: al-’ilâhu (ﺍﻹﻵﻩ), thumma hadhafat al-‘arab al-hamza istithqâlan lahâ, fa-lamma tarakû al-hamza hawwalû (p. 322) kasratahâ fî l-lâm alatî hiya lâm at-ta’rîf, wa-dhahabat al-hamzatu aslan fa-qâlû ’alilâhu ( ﺃﻟﻼﻩ ) fa-harrakû lâm at-ta’rîf alatî lâ takûnu ilâ sâkina, thumma ltaqâ lâmân mutaharrikatân, wa-adghamû al-ûlâ fi th-thâniya fa-qâlû: Allâh ( ﺍﷲ), kamâ qâla llâhu ‘azz wa-jal: lâkinna huwa llâhu ( ﭐﷲ ﻫﻮ) rabbî (Su. Al-Kahf 38; note: the alif of Allâh is alif wasla!).
Translation: … “Allâh ” does not belong to the nouns (asmâ’, plural of ism) which need an etymological explanation like ar-Rahman and ar-Rahim. Mundhiri reported (transmitted) from Abu l-Haitham that he asked for the etymology of the noun “Allâh” according to the language. He answered: In fact, alif and lâm (al-) as the definite article was added to ’ilâh, and it was pronounced: al-’ilâh; then the Arabs omitted the hamza (of ’ilâh) because it disturbed them, and when they withdraw the hamza they moved its “i” to the “l” (lâm) which is the “l” of the definite article, and the hamza became (part of ) the root, and they pronounced it ’alilâhu, thus they vocalized the lâm of the article which (originally) had no vowel, then they combined the two vocalized “l” and integrated the first one into the second one, and then they pronounced it: Allâhu, as God (Allâh) powerful and glorious has stated: lâkinna huwa llâhu rabbî! (Sura al-Kahf 38)
I think Mohd Sani confuses the meaning of the word ism as a noun with the meaning of name. Hence the strange suggestion of translating “ism murtajal” which literally can be translated as “extemporized [proper, sic] name” This sounds like an artificial grammatical category invented on the spot (extemporized indeed!). The best I can make of this convenient category is to compare it with the case of a noun being used as vocative (extemporized) and this is none other than just an appellative (common) noun. Just because a noun is extemporized doesn’t make it a proper name. Indeed, the whole passage from al-Tahanawi cited by Mohd Sani actually actually describes how the noun(not name) “Allâh ” was developed step by step linguistically from al-’ilâh. In short, the passage cited provides no support for the claim that Allâh is a proper name. If anything, al-Tahanawi’s discussion makes clear that Allâh behaves like a common noun.
Prof. Khadijah writes,
Selain itu, istilah Allâh adalah mushtaq iaitu kata nama khas. Ini kerana sekiranya istilah Allâh digandingkan dengan istilah “Ya” dalam bahasa Arab yang bermaksud kata seruan “Wahai”, istilah Allâh tetap kekal. Huruf “alif”, “lam” dan “lam” sebagai konotasi nama khas tidak boleh dibuang. Ia tidak boleh disebut sebagai “Ya Lahu”. Ini berbeza dengan kalimah “Al-Rahman” yang meupakan antara sifat Allâh iaitu pengasih/penyayang. Apabila ia digandingkan dengan istilah “Ya”, alif lam makrifah (kata nama khas) wajar dibuang dan menjadikannya sebagai “Ya Rahman”. Ini membuktikan bahawa istilah Allâh adalah kata nama khas atau mushtaq. (Ibn Manzur, t.t.) Khadijah (5.6).
Response:
This citation seems impressive with its reference to Arabic. If only Khadijah hears an Arab pronouncing “yâ ‘llâha” she might reconsider her dubious claim! The letter “alif” is quite obvious an “alif wasla”, which means an alif which is assimilated by the preceding vowel; more examples will be given in later discussion (baitu ‘llâh, etc.). If she reads more carefully the Qur’an in Arabic, she would realize in all of the 980 times in which Allâh is mentioned in the Qur’an, there is not a single time when the alif is treated as alif hamza (pronounced as ‘a), and in all other occurrences where the alif-lam (article) of Allâh has to disappear it is due to grammatical reasons so that ilâh remains (like “ilâh Ibrâhîm”, “ilâhunâ” [our God], “bi-s-mi ‘llâhi” etc. see below for more discussion). The Qur’an also does not give a single evidence to support the claim that “Allâh” is a proper name, and therefore the alif should be an alif hamza. If she has any doubt she may well consult any concordance of the text of the Qur’an, e.g. the Concordance of Abdul Baqi, published in Cairo several decades ago, and then check one by one of the occurrences of “Allâh ” to see whether she can find a single instance that uses alif hamza.
Further Discussion on Allâh as an Appellative Noun
The claim by Mohd Sani, however, is also questionable on grounds of linguistics. Linguistically, Allâh is a common noun though sometimes it can function as an appellative title.
The Encyclopedia Britannica defines an appellative noun as follows:
“A general appellative (i.e., a common noun) capable of being used in reference to a whole class of entities can also be used with an individual reference. For instance, if an inhabitant of Austin, Texas, says, “Let’s go swimming today, not in the pool but in the river,” there is no doubt that the word river has a unique, individual reference to one single river, namely, the Colorado. This fact, however, does not make a name out of it; “river” is here a common noun, but its reference is specified by the extra-linguistic context” (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/402224/name/61158/Names-and-appellatives).
The New Oxford Dictionary of English describes an appellative noun as “a common noun, such as ‘doctor’, ‘mother’, or ‘sir’, used as a vocative.
To give a further example, the word ‘father’ is a common noun. But it becomes an appellative noun when a child expresses appreciation for his parent on Father’s Day, “Father, you are the best father in the world.” In the same way, Christians sometimes pray, “Heavenly Father”. Finally, someone can pray in desperation, “God, save us!”
In these cases, the appellative usage of the words ‘father’ or ‘God’ takes on the characteristics of a proper noun by connotation (an idea or feeling which a word invokes in addition to its primary meaning). Similarly, the word Allâh may be used in an appellative sense, but it would be wrong for Mohd Sani and Khadijah to claim Allâh a proper noun, much less a proper name.
Let me give a simple (obviously limited) illustration taken from the English language. Compare the following two statements:
(1) God save the Queen
(2) God save Elizabeth
Undoubtedly, when an Englishman utters those sentences he is referring to the same lady. Obviously, the word ‘Queen’ in (1) is a generic noun even though for English people there is only one queen (a monadic, one-of-a-kind noun) with the personal name (Elizabeth) in (2).
The limitation of this illustration lies in the fact that the word Queen remains the same in the English language, but the words el, Allâh or theos would be inflected/declined when used in different syntactical relations in a sentence.
This illustration shows that both Mohd Sani Badron and Khadijah are confused when they appeal to a subjective meaning (connotation) to override the primary meaning of Allâh as a common noun. At best, they may argue that Allâh can subjectively connote a specific reference, but objectively it denotes just a supreme God without any exclusive reference or exclusive description.
It is significant that because Allâh is only one, he needs no other name. Saying “the” God (Allâh) makes it clear who is meant. If he needs a proper name to distinguish him from other gods (âliha) then he would not longer be perceived as the only true one. If Allâh is considered a proper name, this would imply that there are other gods with comparable proper names.
Such would be the case among human beings: All are human, but all have their proper names because there are many. If there were only one human, it would suffice to call him just Adam (equals human being). This one human then does not need a proper name.
Put in the context of historical linguistics, the word Allâh – along with other Semitic words like Hebrew (el, élöhîm) and Arabic (Allâh) – is fundamentally a general term that refers to God. That is to say, Allâh is not a personal name. In linguistic terms, the morphology of the word Allâh follows the grammatical rules of a common noun. Thus the words el and Allâh show morphological inflections/declensions (e.g., depending on whether the word is used as a nominative, accusative, genitive case, etc).
Allâh is not a Personal Name Based on Arabic Morphology
The changes entailed when the word Allâh is used under different grammatical usage in Arabic make it more obvious that it is not a personal name:
If Allâh were a name then it could not be changed under different grammatical usage. This includes the case of the Alif in the beginning, where it should be an alif-hamza (‘), and then it should be pronounced e.g., bismi Allâh (in the name of God), or al-hamdu li-Allâh.
However, this is not the case in actual usage: it is bismi-llah, or al-hamdu li-llah. Why? because the alif is alif wasla, assimilated to the preceding vowel, and that identifies it as the alif of the article which is always alif-wasla.
If Allâh were a name that is unchangeable, then we should be reading: Allâh Ibrahim – with the name remaining unchanged! But it is ilah Ibrahim. Why? Because every noun can at the same time be only determined: either by the article (at-ta’rîf, or: al-), or by a personal pronoun (“my” which), or another noun. In the case of “the God of Abraham”, “Abraham” is the determinator. And that means that any other determinator has to be omitted, in this case the article. Thus it remains “ilah”, and the God of Abraham is Ilah Ibrahim. Who among the Muslims would dare say that the ilah Ibrahim is not Allâh, the only one? But the rule of the language demands that the article al- has to be omitted from Allâh, and then ilah remains.
Of course, there is no direct possibility of using Allâh in the plural. It is a word in the singular, like “man” is also a singular. But at any time you can change it into the plural by using the plural form of the word. The plural form of “man” is “men”. When expressing the plural form of “Allâh”, then Allâh goes back to its original form, al-ilah, and the plural is al-âliha.
Consider further two observations that refute the claim that “Allâh” is a proper name which cannot be changed. Every Muslim on every day for several times would disregard this “rule” if it were true. They say “Al-hamdu li-llah”, “bi smi-llah” If Allâh were an unchangeable name, then they would have to say: Al-hamdu li-Allâh”, “bi smi-Allâh”, etc. Because in that case, the “A” in the beginning may not be changed or, in terms of the Arabic grammar, must be “alif hamza”, in transcription “‘”, like the Greek “‘” (spiritus lenis) before every vowel opening a word. But it is not “alif hamza”; moreover it is “alif wasla”, an alif whose “a” which is assimilated to a preceding vowel, and that is the case of the alif in the article (“al-”). Thus, the alif of the article disappears (is assimilated), and only the “l” remains: bi smi-llah. This proves that the first “A” in Allâh belongs to the article al-, and that Allâh is nothing other than al-ilah (>Allâh). This is the explanation given by the Muslim scholar al-Tahanawi (12th century) in his work Kashshâf. Again, the word Allâh has to be adjusted to the rules of grammar, like any other common noun. In contrast, a personal name would have to be maintained without any change.
It is evident that Allâh is not a personal name and as a generic word/common noun. It follows the grammatical rules of other generic words in Arabic. Whenever a noun becomes connected to some determinator (e.g., personal pronoun, or another noun as “mudaf ilaihi”) like “the father’s house” – where the second word, house, is determined by the first word it loses its article. You cannot say: “the house the father’s”, or “the father’s the house”. Likewise, it is bait al-âb and not: “al-bait al-âb”.
Now consider the case of Allâh = al-ilah: in: “Abraham’s God”, God (”the God”, “Allâh = al-ilah” is determined by Abraham and therefore has to lose its article as well. This means Allâh is used without the article, that is, ilah: ilah Abraham. As such, “Allâh Abraham” is impossible, or grammatically incorrect. You will not find it in any Arabic translation of the Bible or any where else.
There is a plural form of ilah(god): âliha, “gods” or with the article: al-âliha. However, “al-ilah” is only contracted in the singular form. The word Allâh is a singular, like al-ilah, and when there is need for a plural form, it goes back to its root (ilâh) and becomes al-âliha
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Note: Only for those interested in the grammatical parallels between Hebrew and Arabic
I can think of a similar rule in the Hebrew language which is a cognate/Semitic language with Arabic –
The word in the construct state never takes the article. When the compound idea is definite, it is (not the word in the construct but) the genitive (following it) which takes the article, thus we have:
´îš-´élöhîm 1Samuel 9:6 – A man of God.
´îš hä´élöhîm Deuteronomy 33:1 – The man of God. It’s not hä ´îš hä´élöhîm
More immediately related to the present dispute is the case of el/élöhîm. We find in the Hebrew Old Testament the following construct state,
´élöhê ´abrähäm and not ha ´élöhê ´abrähäm – Genesis 31:42, Exodus 3:6 and Psalm 47:9 – ´élöhê being masculine plural construct
Similarly we find,
yad hä´élöhîm 1Samuel 5:11 and 2 Chronicles 30:12 – The hand of God
In the simplest form of the noun, the feminine singular and masculine plural change their forms. However, the masculine singular and the feminine plural do not change externally (forms) but they are recognized as constructs by the maqqeph accompanying them
Obviously, the rule applies for common nouns and not personal names and it applies on how ilah/Allâh is used, it is then a common noun.
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I would like to point out another problem facing the Muslim who insists that Allâh is a personal name. Ism in Arabic (Hebrew: shem) may have the meaning “name”; but it may also mean “noun”. Used as a noun, ism may have different aspects (the reader may consult the Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. “Ism”). In this case, it could be an “ism al-jins”, a “common noun” referring to a group of things with a particular identity. Thus as ism al-jins, ilah refers to anything “divine”. But since according to Islamic theology, only One is of Divine nature, this noun also refers only to the One. I have in mind similarities with the case of a common noun been understood in a monadic sense, like “The Sun” or “The Highest Mountain”.
A personal name could be related to other “persons” of the same kind, or jins. And that is precisely what happened in pre-Islamic times with the word ilah when different deities had additional proper names attached to them, for example, Hubal, al-’Uzza, Manat etc. They were ilah know by his/her name (as specified). The same phenomenon is also found in Hebrew: when ilah (el or eloah) is used, it may be fixed to the name of a worshipper (el Abraham / ilah Ibrahim etc., but we never find the phrase ha-el Abraham or Allâh Ibrahim), but it should be stressed that in these contexts ilah or eloah etc is not itself a name.
If Allâh is a proper name, that is, bearing the meaning of “personal” name, then it would contradict Islamic theology which does not speak about God as a “person” (shakhs). Indeed, this was one of the criticisms directed by classical Muslim theologians against Christians applying the term to God! (in Christian dogmatics the term used is “uknum”, which was derived from Aramaic which finally appeared in the Malay-Indonesian language as oknum = person, individual, personality). But Muslim theologians rejected this term since Allâh cannot have a name attach to him in the manner a name is attached to a person.
It should be noted that precisely because Allâh is not a personal name that it does not appear in the list of the 99 most beautiful names of Allâh (al-asmâ’ al-husnà), that is, the word “Allâh” itself is not mentioned among them. It is only in tasawuf (mystical) Islam with its great exponent Ibn Arabi, that it is sometimes said that “Allâh” is actually God’s 100th name, which embraces all the other 99 names. But this is the emotional language of piety, adoration or worship prominent among some Sufis; it is not the logical language of the dogma of Tawhid. While each of these names of God points to one of His attributes, the word Allâh points to His essence and therefore it cannot be a personal name. For this reason, Muslim theologians have consistently criticized the Christian doctrine of God which understands God as a person. For these Muslim theologians, God is not a ‘person’. Not being a ‘person’, God also cannot have a personal name.
Based on these linguistic observations, Christians are justified in using the word Allâh to translate the word ‘el’/‘élöhîm’ in the Bible as both words are morphologically generic. They are not personal names. In short, since Allâh is not a personal name, it cannot be the sole preserve of Islam.
It is noted that Christians use the word ‘TUHAN’ to refer to the personal name of God YHWH (LORD). Historically, the Hebrew personal name for God, YHWH was translated with the word, ‘kurios’(LORD) for Greek Christians, which in turn was translated into ‘Rabb’ for Arabic Christians. The early Malay Christians naturally used the word ‘Tuhan’ (LORD) when they refer to the personal name of God while retaining the word Allâh for generic references to God.
In actually fact, Christians are precise and purposeful when they carry out their translation. Their ultimate source of reference and authority is not any Islamic words or literature, but the Hebrew and Greek texts. When Christians in Malaysia use the word Allâh, they do indeed use it as an appellative noun. Christians use the word TUHAN as a reference to the LORD, or TUHAN ALLÂH for the LORD God.
Classical Islamic Theology Reject Claim That God Has Revealed His Personal Name
Finally, writers like Mohd Sani Badron have departed from classical Islamic theology when they insist that Allâh is a proper noun/personal name. It is well known that classical Islamic theology does not accept any teaching that God has revealed his personal self, much less his personal name.
For example, Al Ghazali, Muslim philosopher par excellence, in his magnum opus Ihya’ ‘Ulum Ud-Din warns against taking the language literally since the analogy does not have to agree in every way with that which it resembles. Indeed, classical Islamic scholars insist that God transcends all linguistic reference.
Fadlou Shehadi summarized Ghazali’s as follows – God is Utterly Unknowable:
If God is a unique kind of being unlike any other being in any respect, more specifically, unlike anything known to man, it would have to follow by Ghazali’s own principles that God is utterly unknowable. For, according to Ghazali, things are known by their likenesses, and what is utterly unlike what is known to man cannot be known. Furthermore, God would have to be unknowable, completely unknowable, not only to ‘the man in the street’, but to prophets and mystics as well. This is a conclusion that Ghazali states very explicitly and not infrequently. It is also a view that is often stated independently of its logical relation to God’s utter uniqueness. Fadlou Shehadi, Ghazali’s Unique Unknowable God (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1964), pp. 21-22.
Fadlous Shehadi adds,
The end result of the knowledge of the `arifin [knowers] is their inability to know Him, and their knowledge is, in truth, that they do not know Him and that it is absolutely impossible for them to know Him.” Fadlou Shehadi, Ghazali’s Unique Unknowable God, p. 37.
The absoluteness of divine transcendence leading to the conclusion that God has only revealed his will but not his nature (or personality/name) becomes clear in Isma`il al-Faruqi’s dialogue with Christian theologians Kenneth Cragg and Lamin Sanneh in 1976:
al-Faruqi: You spoke of God “willing and wanting to reveal Himself to man”. God does not reveal Himself. He does not reveal Himself to anyone in any way. God reveals only His will. Remember one of the prophets asked God to reveal Himself and God told him, “No, it is not possible for Me to reveal Myself to anyone.”
Cragg: Do you make this distinction absolute? Is not the will expressive of the nature?
al-Faruqi: Only the nature in percipe. In other words, the will of God is God in percipe — the nature of God in so far as I can know anything about Him. This is God’s will and that is all we have — and we have it in perfection in the Qur’an. But Islam does not equate the Qur’an with the nature or essence of God. It is the Word of God, the Commandment of God, the Will of God. But God does not reveal Himself to anyone. Christians talk about the revelation of God Himself—by God of God — but that is the great difference between Christianity and Islam. God is transcendent, and once you talk about self-revelation you have hierophancy and immanence, and then the transcendence of God is compromised. You may not have complete transcendence and self-revelation at the same time.
Ismail al-Faruqi, Christian Mission and Islamic Da`wah: Proceedings of the Chambèsy Dialogue Consultation [held 1976 in Chambèsy, Switzerland], (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1982), pp. 47-48. Available from the Web at Ismail Faruqi Online, “Appendix: Dialogue on the Nature of Islamic Da’wah” : http://www.ismailfaruqi.com/articles/appendix-dialogue-on-the-nature-of-islamic-dawah/
For this reason Islam is resolute in rejecting any attempt to represent God with images. It is therefore a surprise when one comes across passages in the Quran describing God in human terms. Thus, Allâh has a face, hands and eyes:
But will abide (for ever) the Face of thy Lord,- full of Majesty, Bounty and Honour (Quran, 55:27).
(Allâh) said: “O Iblis! What prevents thee from prostrating thyself to one whom I have created with my hands? (Quran, 38:75)
Now await in patience the command [O Muhammad] of thy Lord: for verily thou art in Our eyes (Quran, 52:48).
Muslims accept the Quranic verses that speak of God sitting and coming, and of God’s hands, face and eyes without asking `how’ (bela kayf). In the words of the Muslim scholar al-Ash’ari:
We confess that Allâh is firmly seated on His throne … We confess that Allâh has two hands, without asking how … We confess that Allâh has two eyes without asking how … We confess that Allâh has a face … We confirm that Allâh has a knowledge … hearing and sight … and power [Arberry A. J., Revelation and Reason In Islam, George Allen & Unwin, p. 22].
Classical Muslim theology developed a form of compromise solution in effect inclining to the negative answer. There developed the idea of Al-Mukhalafah, “The Difference.” Terms taken from human meanings – and there are of course no others – were said to be used of God with a difference. They did not convey the human connotation but were used in those senses feasible of God. When the further question was pressed: What then do they convey as applied to God? No precise answer was capable of being formulated. Islam here falls back upon a final agnosticism. Terms must be used if there is to be religion at all. But only God knows what they signify. Muslim theology coined the related phrases Bila kaif and Bila Tashbih. We use these names “without knowing how” they apply and without implying any human similarity. Kenneth Cragg, Call of the Minaret (OUP 1956), p. 55.
Whatever the ‘difference’, bila kaif regarding the names of God, classical Muslim theologians cannot accept Allâh as a proper noun/personal name for the God of the Quran. Writers like Mohd Sani Badron and Khadijah cannot be granted exception to the prohibition set by classical Muslim theology – Allâh is not a personal name. Period.
(3) Refutation of Muslim Scholars’ Arguments in the Allah Controversy. Part 3/3, 1 July 2010
by Kam Weng
Refutation of Muslim Scholars’Arguments in the Allah Controversy. Part 3/3
Translation Issues
To buttress their case, Mohd Sani and Mohd Aizam provide several examples which allege that Christians are inconsistent in their usage of the word Allâh and this results in confusion for both Christians and Muslims. However, their claim of inconsistency shows little understanding of the translation skills required in the translation enterprise that demands the ability to make distinctions when a particular word assumes different shades of meanings (semantic range) in different contexs. This is especially true of Semitic words. For example, the Hebrew word, ruach, can take the following meanings, depending on the context: wind, breath, vital powers, feelings or will. That Mohd Sani seems unaware of these dynamics of translation will be evident when we discuss the translation of élöhîm in Old Testament.
Perhaps considering a local example will help clarify the issue of translation. Take for example, the Shahadah, “There is no god but God.” It is often translated as “Tiada Tuhan selain daripada Allâh”. We note that Tuhan is not the literal equivalent of god; and a word with closer literal meaning in this context should be ‘dewa’. But nobody accuses the local authorities of inconsistency and confusion over the choice of Tuhan rather than dewa. Apparently, local Malay scholars allow for freedom despite normal expectation of literal substitution (assuming that a word can only bear one meaning regardless of the context). Hopefully, this awareness will enable scholars like Mohd Sani to be fair when discussing issues of Bible translation.
Since words always convey a semantic range of meanings, the process of translation often entails contestable words. This provides a special challenge for translators working on Semitic languages whether it be Hebrew or Arabic. A helpful exercise may be found by comparing three authoritative translations of Sura 79: 1-5.
(The list is omitted by Lily)
Arberry ‘s translation, considered by many to be the most elegant English translation of the Quran avoids any imaginative reading of the Arabic text, but it simply doesn’t make sense. Yusuf Ali and Muhammad Asad obviously rely on conjectural emendations. Yusuf Ali could be influenced by Iranian Gnostic ideas when he assumed the verses refer to the souls of the dying. Muhammad Asad is following earlier Quranic commentators when he takes the verses to be referring to celestial bodies. Still, the differences between these three translations are startling.
Whatever the final prevailing version above, it is obvious that Quranic translation (or interpretation) is not spared from contestations even among the experts. It should be a good occasion to remind scholars like Mohd Sani that those who live in glass houses be careful before throwing stones. For the same reason, contestations in linguistics cannot be legislated. It can only be settled eventually by non-polemical and accurate scholarship. Perhaps scholars like Mohd Sani will still want to press ahead to legislate how words and language should be used in Islam, but any attempt to impose their contestable reading of religious texts, especially upon other religions is both a violation of decent scholarship and the freedom and integrity of other religions.
It is appropriate to stress at this juncture that the Islamic Departments in Malaysia are not only seeking to ban the use of the word Allâh. They have gazette orders to ban other crucial religious terms that include the following. They even have the arrogance to suggest that Christians use bizarre alternative words.
Words Banned for Christians// Alternative Words to be used
Al-Kitab // Baibel (Bible)
Allâh // Tuhan (God)
Firman // Berkata (Say)
Rasul // Utusan (Massanger)[sic.]
Iman // Percaya (believe)
Ibadah // Amalan (worship)
Injil // Baibel (Bible)
Wahyu // Revelasi
Nabi // Propet
Syukur // Terima Kasih
Solat // Sembahyang
Doa //Memohon
Banning the use of Allâh and other religious terms against Christians despite the essential contestable concepts of religion is even more grievously inappropriate since Christians are not pretending to be giving Islamic teaching. They are doing nothing more or and nothing less than teaching the Christian religion. Moreover, some of these terms have clear Biblical origins. Certainly, they are not from Islamic background. This includes words like Kitâb (Heb. Ketob), Iman (Heb. Emuna), Ibada (Heb. Avodah) and Injil (Greek: Euanggelion). The word Solat (Syriac: selota) is significant since the Qur’an refers to it as a Christian tradition where it is used in one line with Kitab and Zakat/Zekota (Qur’an Sura Maryam 19: 31). In this case it even maintains the Syriac spelling ( ﺻﻟﻮﺓ , ﺯﻛﻮﺓ, slwt, zkwt, “w” (wâw) instead of the later alif).
The commentary on Sura Maryan 19:31 in Yusuf Ali’s translation even says, “Devotion and Charity is a god description of the Church of Christ at its best, and pity, purity, and devotion in Yahya are a good description of the ways leading to Prayer and Charity, just as John led to Jesus.”
How ironic it is that Malaysian authorities seek to restrict the religious freedom to Christians when the Quran grants them freedom and recognition as People of the Book (ahl al-kitâb).
Response to Dr. Mohd Sani Badron
“Nama Khas “Allah”: Persoalan dan Penyelesaian ”
With these linguistic parameters clarified we can now critique Mohd Sani’s treatment of the few verses he cites from the Al Kitab Malay translation which are primarily taken from Psalm 82. These few verses should be seen in proper perspective of the general reliability of the thousands of verses in the Alkitab. In any case, Christians are themselves aware of the ambiguities that inevitably accompany any translation enterprise.
I refer only to the most significant texts mentioned by Mohd Sani b. Badron (the numbering follows Mohd Sani’s article):
2a) Psalm 82, 1: The Hebrew text uses ‘elôhîm’ for both: God (Allâh) and the gods, according to the linguistic givens of the language. Note that no theological community invents its own language, whether it be Hebrew, Arabic or Malay. These communities use the language which exists in the surrounding culture and then give the necessary definition to the terms used.The context makes it clear which term is used with its specific meaning.
For example, Allâh, based on the rules of language where it is affixed with the “ta’rîf”, or article, becomes a determined noun: “the God”, pointing to (the) One who is special, and therefore, in this form, does not have a plural. This is implied in the rules (grammar) of the language and actually does not need any further explanation. However, further explanations my give further details about the understanding of what “the One” should mean. That would be the task of theologians and not translators.
‘elôhîm sits judging over the ‘elôhîm’ makes it clear that the first word is Allâh (God), and the second word refers to the gods which in the Arabic Bible is rendered by the Arabic plural of ilah, âliha. The translation is correct. I would agree that translating the verse using Allâh in the first place (correct), and Allâh in the second place could lead to misunderstanding. The plural must be expressed, but this does not happen. “Allâh” with a small “a” is not appropriate in our Malaysian context, because, in Malay there is no usage of an article, “a deity” or “a god”. It could be be ilah, or dewa, plural: ilah-ilah or dewa-dewa.
Thus the Malaysian Bahasa Bible is different from the Indonesian Bible when it opts for the translation out of sensitivity to Malaysians:
Psalm 82:1 Allâh mengetuai sidang di syurga; di hadapan makhluk-makhluk syurga Dia memberikan keputusan-Nya (BM).
2b) Likewise for Psalm 82:6: you are ‘élöhîm’, in Arabic âliha is translated in the local Bahasa Bible as, “Aku berkata bahawa kamu ilahi, bahawa kamu semua anak Yang Maha Tinggi.” (BM)
(To be continued.)
